Is China a status quo or revisionist power?

China’s growth, nowadays, is impressive. The weight and the influence gained is vast, from the Asiatic Continent to the rest of the world. In the international community, this is seen in many ways, and many different perspectives analyse this ‘new rise.’ Nobody knows exactly what the rise of China will lead to or the real aims and goals of such politics. The perceptions and aspirations of Beijing are seen globally as a serious topic to face. However, the variety of views show the difficulty of fully understanding China: this is what we can define as a ‘Chinese complex’, which can be considered the long debate about China’s nature: Revisionist or a Status quo power? Threat or opportunity?

In fact, this is not just a bias or a fear for a vast emerging Nation. The behaviour and attitude of the Middle Kingdom improve the fear and concerns, mainly in the international context. The multiple faces showed, and the ambiguity about the nation’s real identity leads to an aura of mystery. What is the real China? The Super Power, the Regional actor, or the Developing country?

However, are just some questions regarding the role and the positioning of the Middle Kingdom in the International scene.

The heated debate around the shadow of China, move this work to analyse the different aspects, theories, and perspective on what is the role of China, how it fits within the existing international institutions, and in which way the Middle Kingdom want (if it really wants) to shape a new conception of the world order with different leadership and institutionally far away from the already existing Western structure, created since Bretton Woods (or even before). Via the use of researches, theories (Realism, Liberalism), and articles by various academics, and not only, the paper aims is to provide several clarification on the topic, and, at the same time, highlight the essential characteristics of China in its impressive growth and rising globally. In sum, understand and determine if China is a Revisionist or a Status quo Power.

When Napoleon in 1817 claimed, “Let China sleep; when she wakes, she will shake the world,” he could not have imagined being more right regarding the future of the global balance of power. If today we talk about China and its role in the world, we are witnessing an unimaginable rise of a State. The economic growth, around the 8%- 9% of GDP since the 1980s, the influence played on other nations (proof of military power, through the massive expenditure in the last year in the military sector, and the role in the South China Sea) in the Asiatic Region and, to a lesser extent, in the international context, is giving rise to many concerns and questions about the future balance of the world order.

From Breslin to Johnston, Goldstein, and Ikenberry, many other academics have expressed their views and perspective on China’s role as a Revisionist or Status quo power. First of all, it is crucial to understand that when we talk about a Revisionist or Power Transition, we are taking into consideration a state which interests are related mainly to its power and prestige above all, will to reshape and mutate at will the international order for its own benefits and its own interests. Opposite to this view is the Status quo or Institutionalist, which is a state who wants to work within the existing international system and is not interested in changing or reshaping the current order; so, it wants to maintain the current status quo. Nonetheless, this is linked with the two leading theories in International Relations[1]: while the Power transition is based, in some ways, on Realist assumption, focused on the power transition from the dominant power (e.g., U.S.) to the new rising power (e.g., China), with the dominant power distracted by other issues; the challenging new powers emerge, and so the hegemonic war is inevitable; on the other side we have the Institutionalist, who are based on more Liberal assumptions, where States choose rationally whether to cooperate or challenge; they can help each other and have mutual benefits instead of costly war; through Institutions, they could create common interests and transparency, thanks to the fact that, from this perspective, institutions reduce the likelihood of war. Opposite to this view is, for example, Graham Allison (2017) who, in his article Part I: The Biggest Player in the History of the World (2017), talks about the possibility for the two Super Powers (U.S. and China) to fall into the ‘Thucydides trap,’ namely the possibility of war when a new actor influence and power is rising, and when the existing power feels threatened. In the article, it is explained the impressive economic growth of China compared to the U.S.

He shows us how the U.S., under the Obama’s administration, tried to rebalance China’s growing weight; in order to demonstrate that while American were debating about where they should have put more weight (in the Middle East or Asia-Pacific Region), China’s kept growing exceeding the U.S. in many economic fields, such as the manufacturing sector (G. Allison, 2017). As Allison claims, this could lead to the ‘Thucydides Trap’: the U.S.’s fear to be surpassed in every sector by China and the fear of becoming the ‘second’ power could lead to war. What Allison highlights is the will of China to change the current International Institutional system through the establishment of its own competitive institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, OBOR) (G. Allison, 2017). The AIIB aims to support, through multilateral financial institutions, the broad-based economic and social development in Asia (Jin Jin Liqun, 2016)[2]. Washington, and Tokyo in part, tried to persuade nations not to join China’s bank (even the U.K. joined), but thanks to the promised investment and the considerable purchasing power, the AIIB surpassed the World Bank as the biggest financer of International Development projects (G. Allison, 2017). From a different perspective is John Ikenberrry’s (2008) view, mainly in the article The Rise of China and the Future of the West, where the Liberal perspective regarding China’s rise emerged. What is important to highlight is the prominent role attributed to China in this historical moment. He recognizes the importance and the influence gained by the Middle Kingdom, together with the possibility to surpass the U.S. and overtake its role as a global leader (J. Ikenberry, 2008).

However, what is crucial in his article is that China will be much less likely to exceed the Western order (J. Ikenberry, 2008), mainly in absolute terms of military and economic productivity. It is true that China, maybe, will overcome the U.S. in the economic term. However, it is also true that if we consider the whole Western system with the combined economies of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), China’s economic advances will be less significant (J. Ikenberry, 2008). Even if we consider the military expenditures, China cannot achieve the same military expenditure as the OECD, at least anytime soon. The point of view expressed by Ikenberry Is exciting and enlightening in many ways. From the paper’s perspective, what is not sharable is the evil role attributed to Beijing, with the necessity by the Western Institutions to contain and control, by any possible means, the rising power of China. All the states should have the possibility to rise and emerge, mainly if the primary concerns are dictated by economic nature.

Walter Russell Mead, in an article published by Foreign Affairs in 2014 “The Revenge of Revisionist Power, takes for granted that China is a Revisionist power, and together with Russia and Iran are considered as the axes of evil, even when the relationship between them is complicated

(W. R. Mead, 2014).

What links this “axis of evil” is the joint agreement that the status quo must be revised[3]. China has no intention of the content itself with a secondary role in international affairs, nor Beijing will accept the current degree of U.S. influence in Asia and the territorial status quo there (W. R. Mead, 2014). This is a critical point to highlight. For the purpose of the paper, China has no intention to leave the U.S. the prominent role gained right after World War II in Asia. In other words, this leads the Middle Kingdom’s behaviour to be more Revisionist, at least regionally, where it has more interests and concerns right now. It is quite evident that China does not accept the influence of the U.S. in the Continent, even because the American influence is too much and it is not ‘acceptable’ by a Regional power such as China; and it is essential to understand the Chinese point of view, who feels threatened by neighbours in the Continent, many of them closer to the U.S.[4]

The problem here would be the Security Dilemma[5]. It is an important topic related to the issue, mainly because China’s expenditures on the military sectors are enormous, and the other state feels intensely threatened by this. However, let us look at this from another perspective. We can understand that China, at the same time, is threatened and contained by the U.S. influence in the region, and what it wants to develop is enhanced regional security cooperation through more cooperation between Asian countries, mainly focused on development. Nonetheless, considering the work by Ian Alastair (2003), Is China a Status Quo Power?, the wish to be more prosperous and more potent by the Chinese leadership has not translated into a concerted military effort to replace the U.S. as the predominant state, globally (I. J. Alastair, 2003).

The concept expressed is shareable because China’s behaviour and intentions, in some ways, are clear and evident. The main concerns right now for the PLA focuses internally and regionally. The PLA is less likely to fight and, indeed, want to concentrate its effort on modernisation, cooperation, and economic development. The Security Dilemma is not the primary concern, even because through the aids and improved cooperation, it wants to enhance the cooperation between the Asiatic countries worried about China’s threat. In other words, it has no intention to increase the security dilemma, but it wants to reduce it.

In conclusion, China is a Revisionist power. It wants to subvert the current Regional Order; it wants to play the leading role; it wants to be the leader and the ‘protector’ of Asiatic countries.

Similarly, Beijing, the PLA, the Party, and Xi Jinping fit perfectly and know how to live, grow, and develop within the existing institutional system. The creation of other institutions, more localized and focused on the region, may have been born before, and it is also quite normal that the leadership is occupied by China, the most powerful and solid-state in the Asiatic Continent[6]. Nonetheless, to support the worries explained by Allison regarding the possibility to fall into a Thucydides Trap, bringing the example of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2017), it is evident the U.S.’s preoccupation about the role of China in the Global order. Through the document, emerge the worry for the competition economically, politically, and militarily. China’s role is seen as the most critical competitor, but that same competitor who steal the U.S. intellectual property, who used unfair tools in the market, who steal the U.S. technology[7]. However, in the document emerge also the word “Revisionist.” States like China, but also Russia, Iran, and to a lesser extent North Korea, are considered as enemies of the U.S. and its partners.

It is weird, reading an official document, signed by the President of the United States (at the time Donald Trump), where the “most powerful” nation in the world (using the American definition) feels threatened and so much worried to be surpassed by other states. Mainly China, which is generally recognized as the main competitor and the United States’ primary concern. Even if in the document China is defined as the power that wants to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interest, emerge the fact that the primary concern of China is the Asiatic Region, and emerge that the U.S. wants to maintain its status in loco. Here, the worries to fall into the Thucydides Trap are real, and the possibility is still realistic. From the paper’s perspective, this is a primary concern of the United States, which does not want to leave the region’s prominent actor role. As a matter of fact, this could lead to war, maybe localized and not a World War. Maybe it will be another Cold War, with different actors, or it already is a form. It is hard to know. What is important to highlight is that China can be considered a Revisionist and a Status Quo power. Realism and Liberalism can explain and offer us valuable theoretical insight. However, to have a reasonable and full interpretation of China’s rise, we must combine these two theories with each other and consider the Chinese characteristics, considering China’s unique culture, civilisation, and historical background. In other words, China can be considered as a Status Quo-tidal power, i.e. a conservative state that loves both its current status and how the tide is running away from the U.S towards China.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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